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Revisiting the Role of Information Format in Candidate Evaluation: An 'Update' Model of Evaluation *
Scott H. Huffmon
Winthrop University
Over a decade ago , Lodge , Stroh, and Wahlke (1990)
wrote that all major models of vote choice and candidate
evaluation
were "black-box " models because they were
"s ilent about the processes that drive their explanations"
(p . 13) . In an attempt to peer inside that black-box,
Rahn , Aldrich , and Borgida (1994) highlight the importance on candidate evaluation of sophisticatio n and the
format in which information
is received ; they conclude
that individuals
use a memory-based,
as opposed to an
impression driven, model of evaluation.
This article offers a re-examination
of Rahn, Ald r ich, and Borgida 's
model . I conclude that their use of fictitious
candidates
and the construction
of some of their variables may have
clouded some of their findings, but several of their theoretical assumptions
are sound . I also posit an "update"
model of evaluation that demonstrates
individuals tend to
use a mixed strategy of both on-line and memory-based
approaches
in creating evaluations
and high l ights the
importance
of the individual's
policy proximity
assessment, sophistication,
and information
format
on the
evaluative process as individuals
update thei r evaluations in light of new information .

• This research is funded by the National Science Foundation (SES-9809223) . 1 would
like to thank the Social Science Research Laboratory at the Univer.;ity of Mississippi for
the use of their facilities and John M . Bruce, Robert D. Brown, and Charles E. Smith, Jr.
for their helpful comments .
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ver a decade ago, Lodge, Stroh, and Wahlke (1990)
wrote that all major models of vote choice and candidate evaluation were "black-box" models because
they were "silent about the processes that drive their explanations" (p. 13). While many scholars have tried to illuminate the
dark recesses of that "black-box," we must often settle for more
prediction than explanation from our models.
Examples of research that probe the black-box can be found
in Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) and Rahn, Aldrich, and
Borgida (1994). The former posits an impression-driven model
of candidate evaluation, while the latter tests the conclusions of
Lodge and his colleagues against a memory-based model, concluding that individuals employ a memory-based approach to
candidate evaluation. This research offers a reexamination of
Rahn, Aldrich , and Borgida's (1994) model and builds on the
foundation they laid.
The crux of the difference between impression-driven and
memory-based models lies in the role of information in the creation of an evaluation. Impression-driven models assume that
evaluations consist of a running tally that is updated with the
application of new information, the details of which are discarded or buried deep within the memory once the evaluation has
been updated. Therefore, when asked to produce an evaluation,
voters need only consult their tally without retrieving the actual
information that served as its basis. Memory-based models, on
the other hand, assume no preexisting evaluation, or tally, residing within the memory. If there is no previous evaluation to rely
upon, voters must recall detailed information from memory in
order to form an evaluation. The question of how individuals
process political information is further complicated, however,
when we introduce the concepts of motivation, sophistication,
and information context.

0

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

INFORMATION FORMAT AND CANDIDATE EVALUATION

37

Srull and Wyer (1986) demonstrated that when individuals
pursue the specific purpose of forming an evaluation, an impression-driven, or on-line, approach is taken. One might assume that
the campaign season would orient the voter to the goal of forming an evaluation leading up to election day. However, depending on the nature of the election, character of the candidates, and
complexity of the issues, the impact of motivation may be
eclipsed or mitigated by political sophistication. Bargh and Thein
(1985) and McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh (1990) found sophistication to have significant impact on the use of an on-line strategy.
Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau (1995) highlight the impact of
time as memory fades (the "forgetting curve") and the importance of campaign information and messages. Further, Rahn, Aldrich, and Borigda (1994) found that the format in which
information was received had a significant interactive impact on
the individual's ability to create candidate evaluations; according
to their findings, information received in a debate-style format
contributed to the use of a memory-based approach to candidate
evaluation.
Unfortunately, the researcher is confronted with a difficult dilemma. In order to test the impact new information on evaluation, the researcher must be certain that the evaluation, once
given, is really the product of the stimulus information and not
merely a reflection of a previous evaluation, one held before the
research began. The traditional way to overcome this problem
has been to ask the research subject to evaluate fictional candidates. Such was the strategy in the evaluation research done by
Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) and Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994). As Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994) note, "[i]n a
real campaign, it would be virtually impossible to isolate voters
before they had any exposure to the candidates" (p. 195).
Using fictitious candidates allows researchers the cleanest
type of experimental design. Since subjects could not possibly
VOL. 31 2003
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have an opinion prior to the experiment, the evaluation must be
the result of information presented in the course of the study.
However, the use of ficticous candidates has an unfortunate side
effect: conclusions drawn from results based on the use of completely unknown candidates are not applicable to most real world
electoral scenarios. If, in real campaigns, individuals never knew
anything about candidates until they were given specific campaign information, experimental design using fictitious candidates would be directly applicable to the "real world." Rarely,
however, are voters introduced to new candidates for the first
time in elections. Although it may be the case more often in local
politics that one or more prospective candidates are relative or
complete unknowns, such occurrences are infrequent in elections
that extend beyond the county line. Given the situation of two
completely unknown candidates competing for the same office, a
model that explains how individuals process information and
how they integrate it into opinions being simultaneously formed
for the first time is appropriate, but for most elections of note, it
is simply not the case. It is difficult to demonstrate either impression-driven or memory-based candidate evaluation strategies
when there are no long held opinions to be updated using one of
these models.
My analysis replicates Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's (1994)
test of impression-driven versus memory-based evaluation and
the impact of information context on evaluation, but I use actual
candidates to create a more realistic evaluative environment. Additionally, naturally created variables are used that more accurately reflect respondents' thinking and attitudes, including a
latent measure of attitudinal strength that thwarts second guessing and artificial attitude justification in respondents' evaluative
reports. Finally, an "update" model of candidate evaluation is
introduced. The model controls for the impact of prior opinion

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

INFORMATION FORMAT AND CANDIDATE EVALUATION

39

while still measuring the impact sophistication, memory, and
information structure.
Attitudinal Strength

Models of comparative candidate evaluation hinge on the accurate measure of the strength of positive or negative opinions
that individuals hold concerning the candidates. Although easy
enough to ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove
of a candidate, it is much more difficult to measure the strength
of that opinion in an accurate way without forcing respondents to
conduct an unnatural over-analysis of their opinions. The dilemma leads researchers unintentionally to change what they
want to measure because of the obtrusiveness of the measurement itself. Traditionally, the best way to measure attitudinal
strength with minimal intrusion has been to ask respondents to
rate their opinions on a scale-a feeling thermometer or a
straight-forward like-dislike scale, for example. Although these
methods keep the artificial noise of over-analysis to a minimum,
they still create an evaluative environment that is not likely to be
reproduced in a real electoral setting.
Attitude strength is of paramount importance in the understanding of how individuals process information. One is more
likely to use strong attitudes when forming evaluations than
weak ones (Fazio 1993; Krosnick and Petty 1995). What is
needed is a way to measure latent attitudinal strength without
forcing respondents to construct an opinion report artificially that
is more subject to measurement error. Studies in the field of psychology have developed such a measure.
Researchers in cognitive psychology, led by Russell Fazio
and others, have used measures of response latency, or reaction
time, to gauge the accessibility and activation of attitudes (Fazio
et al. 1982; Powell and Fazio 1984; Fazio et al. 1986; Houston
and Fazio 1989; Bargh et al. 1992; Doll and Ajzen 1992; DownVOL. 31 2003
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ing, Judd, and Brauer 1992; Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio 1992;
and others). Additional research has shown that important attitudes are more accessible than those attitudes of less importance
(Szalay and Deece 1978). In a meta-analysis of nine previous
experiments, Fazio (1993) confirmed that stronger attitudes lead
to greater accessibility, as measured by reaction time. Similar
conclusions were reached by Bargh et al. (1992) who found that
subjects demonstrated faster reaction times for their strongest
attitudes and slower reaction times for their weakest. Fazio and
Williams (1986) found that evaluations of Republican candidates
in presidential and vice presidential debates were more favorable
among Reagan supporters and that this relationship was stronger
among individuals whose attitudes about Reagan were more accessible. In short, extensive research has confirmed that reaction
times, or response latencies, serve as accurate measures of how
strongly an individual holds an attitude. Drawing on this research, I use response latencies of expressions of approval or
disapproval of candidates as a measure of the strength of respondents' evaluative attitudes. The response latency measure has
additional advantages: it prevents experiment participants from
being "tipped off'' as to the real nature of the attitudinal inquiry.
Research Design
Computer surveys were administered in the Social Science
Research Laboratory at the University of Mississippi. Subjects
were recruited from introductory political science courses at the
university; 107 students participated in the experiment. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 40 years old. Use of the standard
National Election Study (NES) questions revealed that the majority, 82.17%, considered themselves either "strong" or "not so
strong" partisans while 17.83% considered themselves to be political "independents." More than half of the independents were
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partisan leaners, leaving only 7 .92% who considered them selves
to be pure independents.
Although some may question the validity of studies that use
college students as subjects, David Sears (1986) notes that the
consensus in the field of psychology is that ''reliance on college
student subjects does not have major negative consequences" for
experiments. Sears (1986) did, highlight, however, several possible pitfalls of the use of college students. In fact, the major findings of Sears' research were that college students are likely to
have less crystallized attitudes and stronger cognitive skills. Both
of these conditions would work systematically against the models in this research, suppressing the expected relationships. One
might infer that any significant findings would be magnified in
the public.
Upon arrival at the computer lab, subjects were told that they
would be participating in a political opinion survey. Subjects
were randomly assigned to computer stations. The station assignment would determine which type of stimulus, the information context, the subject would see (see Appendix A). For the
stimulus, subjects were exposed to information about Al Gore
and George W. Bush in one of two formats. In the candidatecentered format, information was presented separately for each
candidate. Subjects saw all of one candidate's positions on the
issues followed by the positions of the other candidate on those
issues. In the dimension-centered format (also commonly referred to as "debate-style'' format) information was presented
separately for each issue. Presented with each issue separately,
subjects saw one candidate's position on that issue followed by
the other candidate's position on that issue before being presented with the next issue.
Subjects first answered a series of twelve questions on
whether they approved or disapproved of several items. The first
three questions were non-political and designed to familiarize the
VOL. 31 2003
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subject with the questionnaire format. The remaining questions
probed approval or disapproval of George W. Bush, Al Gore,
politicians in general, the two major political parties, parties in
general, and the institutions of government. Unbeknownst to participants, their reaction time to each question was recorded as
they responded. The next section of the survey asked subjects to
identify the party affiliation of several notable political actors
and to match policy positions to the correct political party as
well as express their own policy preference. Subjects were then
asked to report their partisan identification and ideology. Ideology was measured on a scale ranging from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative . Subjects were then asked to place
George W. Bush, Al Gore, and the two major political parties on
the ideology scale. At this point, participants were presented with
the stimulus that provided policy information for George W.
Bush and Al Gore.
The information was presented in either a candidate-centered
format, where subjects saw all of one candidate's views followed
by all of the other candidates' views, or a dimension-centered
format, in which an issue was presented followed by both candidate's views on that issue (see above). The information was
taken from the candidates' official internet websites. The information presented in both stimuli was identical. Immediately after
the stimuli, subjects were asked again to place George W. Bush
and Al Gore on ideology scales. To serve as a distractor task, the
participants were surveyed on a number of non-political items
before being presented with a quiz on the information that had
been presented in the stimuli. Finally, subjects were again asked
the series of approve-disapprove questions. As before, reaction
times were taken for the approval questions.
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Creation of Variables
Structure (format). Respondents viewed information of Al
Gore's and George W. Bush's policy positions on four issues (see
Appendix A). The policy position information was presented in
either in a candidate-centered format (coded 0) or in a dimension-centered format (coded 1).
Sophistication. Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (RAB) based their
sophistication measure on the established composite method. An
index was created by standardizing and summing four variables:
self-reported interest in politics, exposure to television news,
behavioral participation in political activities, and the number of
correct answers to a five-question political information test.
These four variables were collapsed into a dummy variable along
the median score: 0 = "non-sophisticates" and 1 = ''political sophisticates." The sophistication measure used in the test of
RAB 's model presented here is also a composite score, although
different components and summing techniques were used.
For the research presented here, pre-test interviews with nonparticipants revealed that individuals who reported similar exposure levels to television news were often referring to different
types and qualities of newscasts. For example, some who reported high levels of exposure to television news were referring
to watching a few minutes of CNN's Headline News several
times a day, while others meant never missing the local news,
while yet others referred to being "CNN junkies." Consequently,
I made a judgment that the inclusion of a question addressing
exposure to television news in the composite sophistication
measure might lead to intrusive "noise" in the measure. Moreover, the mediating nature of political efficacy for the relationship between sophistication and participation in political
activities led me also not to use the media exposure question. In
the final wash, it was decided that sophistication would best be
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tapped by using base measures of political knowledge coupled
with self-reported interest in politics.
The measure of political sophistication used in the alternate
model was created by averaging the scores from two political
knowledge tests and weighting this average with the subjects'
political interest. The first test asked respondents to identify the
partisan affiliation of several prominent political actors, while
the second asked subjects to match policy positions to the correct
party. These scores were collapsed into a dummy variable along
the median score: 0 = "non-sophisticates" and 1 = "political sophisticates."
One might argue that by collapsing the political sophistication
variable, valuable information inherent in its original variance is
lost. The question appears to be whether the trade-off between
subtlety and parsimony is valid. In fact, the question is a bit more
complicated. A defense of the use of a collapsed measure of sophistication along a median split begins with the observation that
a collapsed measure is "a standard measure of political sophistication" (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995: 314). A collapsed
measure of sophistication is the norm across seminal works that
serve as a standard for this research (see Lodge, McGraw, and
Stroh 1989; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990; Zaller 1990; Rahn,
Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995).
Moreover, while it is possible to gain greater nuance with more
subtle gradations, the collapsed measure presents a direct comparison with the model of evaluation created by Rahn, Aldrich,
and Borgida (1994). Use of a collapse measure allows for more
direct comparisons with their work.
Party Identification. While both this research and that by
RAB use the traditional seven point partisan scale, there is a key
difference in how the measures were constructed. This research
used the traditional NES format and battery of questions. A score
of "l" represents a strong Democrat and a score of "7" repreTHE JOURNAL
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sents a strong Republican. RAB used one question showing respondents all seven points on the partisanship scale; the result
was an astounding 75% of RAB's respondents claiming political
independence. The use of the multi-question NES format resulted in only 17.83% of the subjects of this research asserting
that they were political independents. The implications of the
difference are discussed further in the examination of the results.
Policy Similarity. RAB asked subjects to place themselves on
five seven-point policy scales. All those responding more conservatively, on the "Republican" side of the scale, were coded
"l," those in the center, "0," and those on the "Democratic" side
of the scale were coded "-1." These scores were summed to create a +5 to -5 scale representing proximity to Republican or Democratic policy positions, respectively. The score served as a
proxy for proximity to the fictitious Republican and Democratic
candidates of the RAB study.
For the alternate model presented here, subjects were asked to
place themselves on an ideology scale immediately after answering questions about their policy preferences. Subjects were also
asked to place George W. Bush and Al Gore on ideology scales
immediately after reading the stimuli containing their policy positions. A relative proximity score was created by subtracting the
absolute value of the difference between the respondent's ideology and his or her perception of Gore's ideology from the absolute value of the difference between the respondent's ideology
and his or her perception of Bush's ideology. More than just
similarity, this calculus creates a relative, or comparative similarity score. Higher scores reflect a greater proximity to Gore. In
the formula, 18 represents respondents' placement of Bush on the
ideology scale, 10 represents their placement of Gore, and IR
represents their own self-placement:
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Comparative Memory. The creation of this variable marks
one of the more notable differences between this model and that
of RAB. The alternate model includes a memory variable. The
memory variable reflects respondents' ability to remember more
facts about one candidate than about the other candidate,
weighted by their approval of each candidate. After completing a
distractor task, respondents were quizzed on the information they
had seen in the stimuli. The comparative memory variable was
created by subtracting the number of correct Bush/policy
matches weighted by Bush's approval rating from the number of
correct Gore/policy matches weighted by Gore's approval rating.
Approval was coded "l" while disapproval was coded "-1." This
score was weighted by the overall percentage correct on the poststimulus quiz.
RAB, on the other hand, created a memory score that was
"positively [or] negatively valenced" in a fundamentally different manner. Respondents were asked to list everything that they
could remember about the candidates. They were then instructed
to note whether they considered these items positive, negative, or
neutral. A "net" memory score was created for both candidates
by subtracting the number of recalled items considered negative
from those considered positive. The net score for one candidate
was subtracted from the other.
It is a standard practice to incorporate participants' affective
responses to what they recall, but the method used in the alternate model is much more latent than that employed by RAB,
making it more accurate and less prone to post hoc justification
by the respondents. In the alternate model, information recalled
is valenced by the underlying level of approval for the candidate
who espouses the recalled position.
Comparative Candidate Evaluation. The biggest difference
between RAB and the alternate model is in the dependent variable. First, and most importantly, the alternative model uses the
THE JOURNAL
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evaluation of real candidates in lieu of fictitious ones. Participants were asked to evaluate George W. Bush and Al Gore. The
experiment was conducted in November 1999, at a time when
each man was considered the front-runner for his party's nomination, but no national debates had taken place.
RAB asked respondents to rate fictitious candidates on a
seven point like-dislike scale. The comparative candidate evaluation was constructed by subtracting one candidate's score from
the other. The alternate model uses a measure of attitudinal
strength based on attitude accessibility as discussed above. After
reading their respective policy positions in the stimuli, respondents were asked whether they approved or disapproved of Bush
and Gore. Their response latencies to these questions were
measured in order to gauge the accessibility of their opinions.
Since shorter reaction times equate to greater accessibility, all of
the latencies were subtracted from the highest score, that is, the
longest reaction time. The procedure reversed the accessibility
measure so that higher scores equated to greater accessibility.
Approval was coded "l" for "approve," "-1" for "disapprove," and "0" for "don't know." The approval score was then
multiplied by accessibility to create a measure of evaluative
strength for each candidate. Bush's evaluation was subtracted
from Gore's to create a comparative candidate evaluation, standardized by dividing by the average accessibility for both candidates. In the formula, GAP and GAc represent approval and
accessibility for Gore, respectively, while BAPand BAc represent
the same measures for Bush:

(GAP*GAc)-(BAP *BAc)
GAC+BAC
2
Allowing "don't know" as a response, and coding it as "0,"
makes an important distinction in the creation of the variable.
VOL. 31 2003
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Not forcing respondents to espouse an opinion that they may not
really hold reduces measurement error. Further, these nonattitudes are, indeed, "zeroed out" of the attitudinal strength calculus by coding them as "O"; therefore, it is impossible to have
either strong or weak non-attitudes, a fact that controls the introduction of measurement error by non-attitudes as noted by Converse (1970).

Questions about Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's (1994) Model
It is likely that several of RAB 's findings are the result of
how they constructed their model. After being introduced to the
"candidates" for the first time in the video stimulus, subjects
were asked to rate each candidate on a seven point like-dislike
scale. Their dependent variable, comparative candidate evaluation, was constructed by subtracting one candidate's score from
the score of the other candidate. The primary bases for liking or
disliking a candidate would have been partisanship and an opinion formed from the policy positions they just heard each candidate espouse. There were no other available tools for evaluation,
except, perhaps, visual affect, which the model is not designed to
measure.
The key independent variables were (a) an interaction between the format (structure in which the information was presented) and comparative candidate memory and (b) an
interaction between these two variables and the subjects' political sophistication. However, there may be a problem in the construction of the comparative candidate memory variable, the key
variable in both of these interaction terms. In RAB, comparative
candidate memory was constructed by having the subjects list
everything they could remember about what they had just heard
or seen. Subjects then went back and noted whether information
they had listed about the candidates was positive, negative, or
neutral. The number of negative items for each candidate was
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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subtracted from the number of positive items. Finally, one candidate's "net" memory score was subtracted from the other candidate's "net" memory score.
The dependent variable measures whether subjects like or dislike the candidates based on the policy positions they just heard.
A primary component of the comparative candidate memory
score is based on whether subjects like or dislike what they just
heard: the policy positions of the candidates. Since the bases of
both of these variables are so intricately interconnected, it seems
unlikely that any significant relationship between them, or any
interactive term of which they are components, could be attributed accurately to anything other than their common roots. The
broader implication of this fact is that the model, although ingeniously conceived, may not offer a fair test of memory-based versus impression-driven evaluation because of potential bias in the
variable construction. Further, if there is a question about the
construction of key variables, the test of the influence of information structure, an important contribution to the literature on
evaluation, may be flawed as well. Simply put, the use of fictitious candidates, for whom it is impossible to test a "running
tally," the construction of the memory variable that mimics that
of the dependent variable, and the non-traditional construction of
the partisanship variable, which, as noted above, netted 75% of
participants claiming to be independents, limits the ability of the
RAB model to test the original hypotheses.
Expectations and Results of Model Comparison
This analysis offers a more realistic test of the RAB model,
using variables that are more naturally constructed, yet controlled by experimental design. Based on research from the field
of cognitive psychology, the dependent variable used here reflects the strength of respondents' evaluations of Gore relative to
the strength of their evaluation of Bush. The alternatively created
VOL. 31 2003
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comparative memory score is more latently valenced, and, therefore, offers a direct test of the impact of information recall on
candidate evaluation without the confounding effect of introducing an evaluation of the information provided by the candidate.
The results of the model comparison may be found in Table 1.
In the alternate model, only partisanship and policy similarity
drive comparative candidate evaluation, explaining more than
half of the model variance. The notable increase in amount of
variance explained is likely due to the use of the traditional three
part NES question to determine partisanship as opposed to showing subjects all seven points on the partisanship scale and allowing them to position themselves on the scale. Note that because
the alternative model uses Gore as the baseline candidate, and
higher numbers on the partisanship scale represent Republicans,
the relationship between evaluation and partisanship should be
negative; the directional difference with RAB reflects their use
of the Republican as the baseline candidate. The increase in the
size and significance of the policy similarity variable is likely the
result of a direct comparison to subjects' perceptions of Gore's
and Bush's policy positions as opposed to a broader similarity to
the general policies of the candidates' parties.
The use of a variable measuring the quality and content of
memory, without a conscious evaluation of its contents, shows
that recall memory does not appear to be a driving factor in candidate evaluation . However, RAB's findings should not be readily dismissed. Their assumptions were based on solid theory.
Perhaps the failure of this variable in the replication is related to
a problem with the dependent variable in the alternate model.
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TABLE 1
Regression on Comparative Candidate Evaluation
on Memory, Information Structure, and Political Sophistication
RAB
Model*

Alternate
Model

Partinship

.28+
(. 16)

-.29§
(.06)

Policy Similarity

. 18+
(.09)

. 17§
(.05)

Comparative memory

.02
(. 11)

Comparative Memory X Sophistication

.16
(.14)

Comparative Memory X Structure

.32!
(. 12)

.00003
(.00002)
-.00001
(.00002)
-.00004
(.00003)

Comparative Memory X Sophistication
X Structure

-.47!
(.17)

.00005
(.00003)

Structure

-.68
(.56)
-.18
(.54)

.52
(.29)
.03
(.30)

Sophistication X Structure

-.37
(.81)

-.11
(.43)

.33

.54

104

101

Variable

Sophistication

Adjusted R 2

N

•Reproduced from Table I, p. I 98 in Rahn, Wendy M ., John H. Aldrich, and
Eugene Borgida. I 994. "Individual and Contextual Variations in Political
Candidate Appraisal. " American Political Science Review 88:193-99.

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients ; standard errors are in
parentheses. +p < .05 1P< .01 §p < .001
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The formula posits that in a more realistic setting, individuals
integrate new infonnation by checking this information against
prior "impressions," that is, individuals' previously created proximity assessments. Individuals' initial assessment of the candidate (subconsciously logged impressions of the candidate's
ideological and policy positions) relative to individuals' established ideological preferences must be consulted in light of new
information. As they update the assessment of their proximity to
the candidates based on new information, they will update their
evaluations.
The ability to update impressions is likely to be mediated by
sophistication, dependent on information structure, and individuals' relative recall ability. Measuring these phenomena requires
the use of a mixed evaluative strategy. When asked to create an
evaluation, individuals compare their existing, or "on-line," assessment to new information in their memories. The updated
model draws on research by Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau
(1995) to posit the mixed strategy. Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau
(1995) highlight the importanC,;eof campaign message, but note
that the utility of memory decays as people forget specific items.
A mixed strategy is adopted in the updated model because it is
believed that individuals will draw from direct memories of
campaign messages if they have any, but will also rely on the
relation of new memories to previously created impressions; impressions formed, in part, from forgotten memories of previous
messages.
To test the updated theory, a variable measuring the proximity
reassessment function occurring before the evaluative update is
needed. A variable was created reflecting the policy similarity
correction. The variable reflects the change in individuals' assessments of policy proximity from before and after the introduction of new information. A measure of similarity (described
above) is taken before (denoted with a subscript "1 ") the introVOL. 31 2003
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An "Update" Model of Evaluation
The alternate model presented above is open to the criticism
that all of the relationships are confounded by the influence of
prior opinion, the reason RAB used fictitious candidates. For
example, an individual's opinion of Gore or Bush may very well
be memory based, but drawn from the wealth of information received prior to the introduction of the stimulus and, therefore,
would show no relationship to a memory score based solely on
recollection of the stimulus.
The following formula controls for the influence of prior
opinion on candidate evaluation. Comparative candidate evaluation is measured before any new information is introduced to the
subjects, as well as after the introduction of the controlled information. The dependent variable in this model represents change
in comparative candidate evaluation from "before" (T 1) to "after" (T2) the presentation of new information, the introduction of
which is controlled by experimental design. Both pre- and poststimulus comparative candidate evaluations are standardized to
allow comparability and control for decreased response time
based solely on familiarity with experimental procedure. By design, any change in comparative candidate evaluation is the result of the introduction of this information. In the formula, GAP1
and GAc1,and BAP,and BAci, represent approval and accessibility for Gore and Bush prior to the presentation of the stimuli
while GAP2and GAc2, and BAn and BAe2,indicate the same measures after the presentation of the stimuli:
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duction of the stimulus, representing the current assessment, or
"tally," and another is taken after the introduction of the stimulus
(denoted with a subscript "2"). The difference between the before and after measures is the policy similarity correction score.
It represents the impact of the new information on the assessment of similarity.
In the formula, Ia1 and l 8I represent the respondent's placement of Gore and Bush prior to the introduction of the stimuli,
while Io2 and l 82 reflect respondent's placement of Gore and
Bush after viewing the stimuli. Respondents' self-placement is
represented by IR.. Measures of partisanship, sophistication,
structure, and comparative memory are the same as above:

The full model posits
Change in Comparative Candidate Evaluation = a +
bJ(Partisanship) + bi(Comparative Memory) +
b.i(Structure)+ b4 (Sophistication) + bi_Policy Similarity
Correction [PSC] ) + b6{PSC * Sophistication) +
b7(Comparative Memory * Sophistication) + b8(PSC *
Structure)+ b9 (PSC * Comparative Memory).

Partisanship is still expected to play a significant role; again,
because of the coding scheme, the coefficient should be negative.
Comparative memory is expected to be significant due to the
importance of campaign message recall in evaluation. However,
because of the construction of the dependent variable, the sign
should be negative. If respondents can produce an evaluation as
quickly (creating no significant impact) or more quickly (inducing a positive sign) then it would seem that respondents are not
integrating new information in their memory. However, if they
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are drawing from their memory, they should have to pause as
new information is integrated into candidate evaluation. Policy
similarity correction should have a negative impact as well. If a
notable reassessment of one's relative proximity to the candidates must occur, then it seems logical that one must pause to do
this. Whether the process is significant likely hinges on the importance of the interaction of proximity variable with sophistication and with structure. On their own, structure and
sophistication are not expected to be significant since their influence is likely to be mediated by other variables in the model,
hence the interactive terms.
The interaction between policy similarity correction and sophistication should be significant and negative. Respondents who
have a greater discrepancy between pre- and post-stimulus policy
assessment should pause as they re-evaluate the candidates;
however only the sophisticated have the ability to reevaluate,
meaning that the "pause" should occur only among the sophisticated. A deeper understanding of the process might be seen by
comparing it to findings by McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh (1990)
regarding information overload and non-sophisticates . In their
model, those who are overloaded by a change in policy similarity
correction discount the change allowing the post-stimulus comparative evaluation to be made as quickly, or perhaps even more
quickly because of other factors. Another way to put it is that the
unsophisticated will fail to recognize that their previous assessment was in error; therefore, no change should be seen for them.
The interaction between comparative memory and sophistication should be positive and significant. The politically sophisticated should be better equipped to apply the newly acquired
information to their evaluation.
The interaction between policy similarity correction and
structure should be positive and significant if information format
truly makes a difference. The argument is that the debate-style
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format makes it easier to catalog information in order to determine whether a correction of the respondent's understanding of
policy similarity is necessary. The debate format allows for the
easier creation of a "checklist" of policy position proximities.
Because of the "forgetting curve" (see Lodge, Steenbergen, and
Brau 1995), the previous proximity assessment is likely the result of an impression driven evaluation. If that evaluation is to be
corrected in light of the memory of recently acquired information, then this process should be facilitated by a format allowing
for maximum distinction between the candidates on each policy
issue. The result would be the use of a mixed strategy for evaluation facilitated by the format of the information. Previous impressions are being updated with new information from recent
memory and the debate-style format presents the information in
the most accessible manner.
The interaction between policy similarity correction and
comparative memory should be significant and negative. Higher
scores on the component variables of the interaction indicate that
respondents having more information in recent memory to consult must do more correction to their previous proximity assessment. Comparisons between earlier and later information should
take longer, resulting in a negative relationship with the dependent variable. However, because a mixed strategy is theorized, a
variable representing both memory-based information and impression-derived information should be significant.

Findings
The results of the "update" model may be found in Table 2.
As expected, partisanship still plays a significant role in evaluation. On its own, sophistication did not reach statistical significance: this was expected because of the influence of
sophistication in the interactions. The same is true for the structure variable. Also as expected comparative memory was signifiTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
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cant and in the expected direction, lending some support to the
memory based approach suggested in RAB. Policy similarity
correction, however, did not reach statistical significance, indicating that if an on-line ("impression-driven") strategy is used, it
is mediated by some other variable and/or is part of a mixed
strategy.
Lending evidence to the possibility of the use of a mixed
strategy, the interaction between policy similarity correction and
sophistication worked as expected, meaning that sophisticated
individuals are more likely to pause as they update their comparative candidate evaluation in order to integrate their new assessment of policy similarity. However, the pause effect only
occurs when individuals must adjust, or correct, their assessment
of the candidates' ideologies after being given information on
their policy positions. Further, the pause only happens if individuals are sophisticated enough to realize that their original assessment was in error. We are almost seeing a snapshot of
individuals' thought process as they reevaluate candidates in
light of new information.
Politically sophisticated respondents do seem more likely to
pause and ponder the implications of erroneous previous impression driven (or "on-line") evaluations as they update their
evaluations. Finding evidence for the on-line strategy here as
well as the memory based strategy demonstrated above seems to
confirm the hypothesis of the use of a mixed strategy.
The interaction between comparative memory and sophistication was significant and in the expected direction. Applying recently acquired information to an evaluation is easier for those
who are more politically sophisticated. As evidenced by this and
the previous variable, the ability to use efficiently a mixed strategy seems to be related to political sophistication.
• The interaction between policy similarity correction and
structure was significant and in the expected direction, as well. If
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respondents need to reassess their relative policy proximity to
candidates, the debate-style format, highlighting the comparative
policy positions of the candidates, makes it easier to do so.
Finally, the interaction between policy similarity correction
and comparative memory (variables representing an impressiondriven evaluative strategy and a memory-based strategy, respectively) is significant, and in the predicted direction. The results
produce further evidence of the use of a mixed strategy. If individuals are applying information from recent memory to an
TABLE2
An "Update" Model of Candidate Evaluation
Regression of Change in Candidate Evaluation on Policy Correction,
Information Structure, Memory, & Political Sophistication
Unstandardized
Independent Variables
Coefficients
-. 158t
Partisanship
(.002)
-.00003t
Comparative Memory
(.00001)
.002
Structure
(.210)
.282
Sophistication
(.225)
-.02
Policy Similarity Correction
(.09)
-.247+
Policy Similarity Correction X Sophistication
(. I 09)
.00004 +
Comparative Memory X Sophistication
(.00002)
.240+
Policy Similarity Correction X Structure
(. 1003)
Policy Similarity Correct ion X Comparative Memory
Adjusted R2
N

-.OOOOlt
(.000004)
.24

IOI

Note : Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients ; standard errors are in parentheses. +p< .05 tp < .01
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evaluation that is significantly different from earlier impressions
of the candidates, then the comparison takes more time, causing
pauses as candidate evaluations are updated.
Conclusions
The research presented here accomplishes two things. First, it
has replicated the work by Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida (1994)
using real candidates and alternatively created variables. Second,
it builds upon RAB and other research to offer a model of candidate evaluation that maps the processes used by individuals to
update their comparative evaluations. In so doing, the "update"
model offers support for a mixed strategy of candidate evaluation.
The reexamination of RAB 's model calls into question the
construction of several of their variables and several of their
findings. However, much of their theory and many of their assumptions appear to be correct. The common roots of the construction of comparative candidate evaluation and comparative
candidate memory cast doubt upon the accuracy of their findings
regarding the relationship between these two variables and the
relationships between comparative candidate evaluation and all
interactive independent variables of which comparative candidate memory is a component. However, the difference is with
their measures, not their theory. Abandoning the standard NES
battery of questions measuring partisanship in favor of showing
respondents all seven points of the partisanship scale at once,
raises concerns about the validity of their partisanship variable.
The minimal role of partisanship in their model is pr9bably because of variable measurement. Moreover, the use of fictitious
candidates biases the model against the possibility of finding
evidence for an impression-driven approach to candidate evaluation: respondents cannot have an impression evaluating candidates of whom they have never heard. Therefore, even a failure
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to reject the null hypothesis that comparative candidate memory
does not drive the comparative evaluation of fictitious candidates
in RAB's model cannot be interpreted as supporting the theory of
impression-driven evaluation. Finally, their memory score is
likely to show a significant relationship to their dependent variable because of the construction of both variables
Although this article questions several about their measures,
it does not cast doubt on Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida's theoretical
contribution to the literature. Their model may not include a full
test of memory-based versus impression-driven evaluation, but it
does highlight the important role that information context, or
format, plays in the evaluative process. The "update" model of
evaluation presented here builds upon and expands that contribution.
All models of evaluation that use real political figures as their
objects of appraisal are open to the criticism that the researcher
cannot determine if the reported evaluation is the product of his
or her independent variables, or simply reflects a long held opinion that preceded the measures of the model. The update model
presented here controls for this problem by measuring comparative candidate evaluation both before and after the introduction
of the stimulus information. By subtracting the measure taken
prior to the introduction of new information from the poststimulus measure, one is left with a variable that measures the
effect of current information on candidate evaluations. Individuals do draw on recent memory to make evaluations, but there is
evidence that they consult previous impressions as well.
Realizing that the information presented in the study might
differ from what subjects "thought they knew" about the candidates, this analysis measures the change in individuals' perceived
proximity to candidates. The policy similarity correction interacts with sophistication, structure (information format), and
comparative memory. The interaction between perceived proxTHE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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imity to a candidate and political sophistication demonstrates
that receiving information incongruous with previous assessments produces a discrepancy more readily recognized by those
sophisticated enough to pick up on the inconsistency.
It appears that individuals assess new information to update
their candidate evaluations; however, the ability to do so is mediated by sophistication and facilitated by the "pre-sorted,"
checklist nature of information provided in a dimensioncentered, or debate, format. Information received this way is
more readily applied to proximity assessments that are then used
to update evaluations, or the information is examined for discrepancies, depending on individual sophistication. The update
model lends support to both the memory-based and on-line
evaluation debate, suggesting that individuals tend to use a
mixed strategy of evaluation. Although the function of recall
memory is important on its own, it also serves as a tool to update
the previous on-line tally. Both the on-line impression and memory recall play a role in the creation of an evaluation. It is possible that as the salience of the new information diminishes, its
accessibility in the memory fades eventually leaving only an impression of the assessment created because of it. If true, then the
use of an on-line, memory-based, or mixed strategy may well
depend, in part, on a time and salience factor. Hopefully, future
research will be able to answer this question.
Not addressed in the update model is how long the specifics
of the new information remain in the memory of individuals and
at what point the new information becomes part of the overall
"impression" of candidates while the details of the information
are lost. The loss of memory detail is referred to as "decay" or
the "forgetting curve" (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995).
However, the finding of a mixed strategy of evaluation does add
to the memory-based versus impression-driven debate (see
Hastie and Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge,
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Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; McGraw, Lodge, and Stroh 1990;
Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1994; Bargh and Thein 1985). Naturally, since evaluation is such an important part of vote choice
this has direct bearing on models of vote choice.
Another finding of this research is that the format in which
information is received makes a difference in individuals' ability
to process information and recall it to update their existing candidate evaluations. The important implications for this finding
relate to the role of the media and campaigns in the calculus of
individual voters. It has already been established that the structural features of the presentation of information in television impact viewer attentiveness involuntarily (Lang 1990; Thorson,
Reeves, and Schleuder 1985). There is also ample evidence that
campaign messages have a substantial impact on evaluations (see
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Bartels 1993; Marcus
and MacKuen 1993; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). This
impact is independent of recall. In fact, if only recall played a
role in evaluations, campaigns would matter little as time robbed
them of their effect on decision-making with regard to long-term
(non-election specific) evaluations (Lodge, Steenbergen, and
Brau 1995).
Given the role of campaigns, however, these findings imply
that new information garnered in campaigns is checked against
existing impressions for comparability and used to update one's
evaluation and this process is facilitated when the information is
received in a dimension-centered format. Campaign information
is relevant as it contributes to the impression used to create the
evaluation and more effective when it is presented in the most
digestible form. However, political sophisticates are more likely
to give pause while creating an updated evaluation when the information received runs counter to their previously established
impression. Sophisticates may be "screening" information for
congruity, but their ability to do so may be related to the format
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of the information. This greatly increases the importance of not
only campaigns, in general, but also specific types of campaigns
in the formation of political evaluations and, through evaluation,
voter choice.
My findings have implications beyond those directly tested in
the models. For example, one of the broader implications regarding information context, or structure, might speak to the way the
media cover political campaigns and candidates. If information
is received in a dimension-centered format, it appears to aid information processing as individuals reassess candidates and seek
to comparatively evaluate them, is there an obligation on the
media---or the candidates themselves-to provide information in
the most digestible form? Given the fact that sophistication mediates the impact of policy reassessment on evaluation, what are
the obligations to those with less political savvy? Such normative questions are left to future research.
APPENDIXA

Note: All information is taken from official candidate websites.
Candidate-Centered Stimulus
George W. Bush. George W. Bush has issued several statements
concerning his position on some of the most important issues of the
presidential campaign of 2000. Bush has stated that there should be no
reduction in Social Security benefits for retirees or near-retirees. He
also opposes any tax increase for Social Security and is against the investment of Social Security funds in the stock market by the government. With regard to Medicare, Bush supports providing more choice
and more private sector alternatives for the elderly. He has also spoken
in favor of medical savings accounts and offering prescription drug
benefits to Medicare recipients. On gun control, Bush opposes the government mandated registration of all guns owned by law abiding citizens and supports their constitutional right to own guns. He has spoken
in favor of the stronger enforcement of existing gun laws instead of the
creation of additional ones. Bush is in favor of instant background
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checks at gun shows. On the topic of education, Bush supports a
"school voucher" type program that would give parents federal funds to
be used for public and private school choice and innovative education
programs. He further supports implementation of state accountability
systems in which students are tested every year in grades 3-8 in reading
and math in order to gauge the effectiveness of school
systems.
Al Gore. Al Gore has addressed his issue positions on several of the
most important issues of the presidential campaign of 2000. In order to
keep Social Security solvent, Gore supports the investment of part of
the budget surplus in the stock market and scaling back some benefit
levels. He would also like to eliminate the limit on what older Americans on Social Security can earn. On Medicare, Gore has spoken in
favor of a prescription drug option for all Medicare beneficiaries. He
has also suggested eliminating the deductible and all co-payments on
preventive benefits covered by Medicare. With regard to gun control,
Gore supports the passage of new laws designed to keep guns off the
streets. In the past, Gore worked to help enact a ban on assault weapons. He also has supported the Brady Law which requires background
checks for gun purchases and imposes a five day waiting period for
those states without "insta~t background checks." On the topic of education, Gore opposes "school voucher" programs, instead supporting
additional funding made available to states for the purpose of reducing
drop-out rates and increasing student achievement in failing school
districts. Gore also wants to use technology to increase educational
productivity and increase the number of computers in public schools.
Dimension-Centered Stimulus

Please read the following information about the policy positions of
the two leading candidates for the Presidential Election of 2000.
Social Security. George W. Bush: has stated that there should be no
reduction in Social Security benefits for retirees or near-retirees. He
also opposes any tax increase for Social Security and is against the investment of Social Security funds in the stock market by the government.
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Al Gore: In order to keep social security solvent, Gore supports the
investment of part of the budget surplus in the stock market and scaling
back some benefit levels. He would also like to eliminate the limit.on
what older Americans on Social Security can earn.
Medicare. With regard to Medicare, Bush supports providing more
choice and more private sector alternatives for the elderly. He has also
spoken in favor of medical savings accounts and offering prescription
drug benefits to Medicare recipients.
Al Gore: On Medicare, Gore has spoken in favor of a prescription
drug option for all Medicare beneficiaries. He has also suggested eliminating the deductible and all co-payments on preventive benefits covered by Medicare.
Gun Control. George W. Bush: On gun control, Bush opposes the
government mandated registration of all guns owned by law abiding
citizens and supports their constitutional right to own guns. He has
spoken in favor of the stronger enforcement of existing gun laws instead of the creation of additional ones. Bush is in favor of instant
background checks at gun shows.
Al Gore: With regard to gun control, Gore supports the passage of
new laws designed to keep guns off the streets. In the past, Gore
worked to help enact a ban on assault weapons. He also has supported
the Brady Law which requires background checks for gun purchases
and imposes a five day waiting period for those states without "instant
background checks."
Education. George W. Bush: On the topic of education, Bush supports a "school voucher" type program that would give parents federal
funds to be used for public and private school choice and innovative
education programs. He further supports implementation of state accountability systems in which students are tested every year in grades
3-8 in reading and math in order to gauge the effectiveness of school
systems.
Al Gore: On the topic of education, Gore opposes "school voucher"
programs, instead supporting additional funding made available to
states for the purpose of reducing drop-out rates and increasing student
achievement in failing school districts. Gore also wants to use technology to increase educational productivity and increase the number of
computers in public schools.
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